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 2 
EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF THE HOUSE-MONEY EFFECT IN A PUBLIC 
GOODS GAME 
 
Experiments in economics usually begin with an initial endowment to subjects. Essentially, 
subjects are given starting capital to be used in the games conducted by the experimenter. 
While this practice is necessary to conduct the experiment, it could potentially affect the 
decisions of the subjects as there is no risk of suffering any net monetary loss. This 
phenomenon is known as the house-money effect. Since the original discovery, the house-
money effect has been studied in different contexts and settings. The results from these 
experiments have varied. This study serves as a robustness check on past research conducted 
on the house-money effect.  
The experiment was conducted with 69 student subjects in two treatment groups. Thirty-six 
subjects participated in the house treatment where subjects were credit money in their 
experimental accounts upon arrival at the public goods experiment (standard protocol in 
experimental economics). Thirty-three subjects participated in the advance treatment where 
subjects were given money prior to arriving at the public goods experiment. Additionally, 
subjects in each treatment participated in two sessions spread across three weeks. In 
conclusion, the study does not find strong statistical evidence of a house-money effect within 
the public goods environment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.         Introduction  
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Experiments in economics usually begin with an initial endowment to subjects. 
Essentially, subjects are given starting capital to be used in the games conducted by the 
experimenter. While this practice is necessary to conduct the experiment, it could potentially 
affect the decisions of the subjects as there is no risk of suffering net monetary loss. This 
phenomenon is known as the house-money effect. People tend to be more risk-seeking with 
easily gotten money. This behavioral pattern was first analyzed by Thaler and Johnson (1990).  
Since the original discovery, the house-money effect has been studied in different 
contexts and settings. Clark (2002) and Cardenas et. al. (2014) examine the house-money effect 
using a public goods game and an ordered lottery selection, respectively. The results from these 
experiments have varied. Clark (2002) found that subjects who were given house-money were 
no more or less cooperative than those who had been given their endowments in advance. 
However, when Harrison (2007) reanalyzed the same data, a significant effect was found. 
Similarly, when additional research was conducted by Cardenas et. al. (2014), evidence 
suggesting a house-money effect was identified.  
The mixed results in the literature suggest that the identification of a house-money 
effect is sensitive to features of the experimental design, particularly to differences in how 
advance payments are made to subjects. Clark (2002) simply asks subjects to bring a specified 
amount of their own money to the experiment, while Cardenas et. al. (2014) provides subject 
an advance payments three weeks prior to the experiment. By combing design elements from 
Clark (2002) and Cardenas et. al. (2014), this study re-examines the presence of the house-
money  
Sixty-nine subjects participated in a public goods game. Subjects’ contributions to the 
public good serves as a measure of their cooperation with fellow-group members. Considering 
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the importance and ubiquity of cooperation in social and economic interactions, it is important 
to understand the impact of the timing of receipt of individuals’ endowments on their choices 
in this setting.  
Thirty-six subjects participated in the house treatment and 33 subjects participated in 
the advance treatment. Each subject self-selected the time in which they would attend the 
experiment. They had no previous knowledge of the experimental treatments, nor the treatment 
in which they would be participating in. Per economic experimental convention, the money 
distributed to the advance subjects covered the potential for net losses. However, each subject 
had the potential to earn more or less than the endowed amount.  
In contrast to economic experimental convention, each subject in the advance treatment 
received an endowment of $12.50 three weeks prior to the experiment. These subjects were 
told to each bring $12.50 when they returned to the laboratory for the actual experiment. 
Subjects were intentionally not told to bring the same $12.50 cash previously given. The 
experiment was designed in this way, so subjects felt no direct pressure to save the advance 
$12.50. In a post-experiment questionnaire, we asked subjects how much of the advance 
payment they had left, thus requiring this amount to be replaced before they returned. 
Ultimately, this design seeks to closely resemble the subjects using their own money in the 
experiment, as they were able to spend the money prior to the experiment, while still 
maintaining the requirements set forth by IRB.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a review of previous research 
conducted on the house-money effect. Section 3 details the experimental design utilized in this 
study. Section 4 presents the results and analysis. Section 5 includes a brief discussion and 
summary of the study. 
 5 
2.         Literary Review 
Past evidence suggests people receiving small, one time “windfall gains,” often exhibit 
riskier behavior with this gain. This phenomenon has been labeled the house-money effect 
(Thaler and Johnson, 1990). Standard experimental economics protocol provides each 
participant an initial endowment of money to be used in the experiment. Past experimental 
economics studies using the voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) found a significant 
proportion of subjects contribute towards a public good, even though the individual payoff-
maximizing choice is to free-ride on others’ contributions (Ledyard, 1995).  
Clark (2002) examines whether behavior in economic experiments using the voluntary 
contribution mechanism (VCM) for public goods is affected by the origin of the funds 
participants used. Additionally, the study analyzed whether the level of provision observed in 
VCM experiments provide a misleading indication on the degree of free-riding organizations 
can expect.  
At the opening of each decision round in a VCM public goods experiment, each subject 
is matched with our subjects to form a group and is s endowed with experimental tokens (Isaac 
et al., 1984 and Andreoni, 1995). In Clark (2002), subjects were placed groups of 5 and 
endowed with 80 experimental tokens. Subjects then allocated tokens between an “Individual 
Exchange” and a “Group Exchange.” Each token in the Individual Exchange yields one cent 
and each token in the Group Exchange two and one-half cents. Tokens allocated to a subject’s 
Individual Exchange yield private earnings for that subject. Each token allocated the Group 
Exchange by a group member yields a half cent per group member. This game was repeated 
for 10 decision rounds. The dominant strategy for each subject is to invest zero tokens into the 
Group Exchange every decision round. However, if each subject contributed all 80 tokens to 
the Group Exchange every round, each subject would earn $20, a $12 increase from the 
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dominant strategy payoff of $8. Thus, group members allocating their entire endowment to the 
Group Exchange is socially optimal. 
Clark (2002) conducted with two treatment groups, the house-money treatment (H), 
and the own-money treatment (O). The recruitment conditions were the same for each 
treatment group. Each subject was recruited with the requirement, “you must bring $8 to the 
experiment.” Each subject was told they could avoid losing this $8 with certainty through their 
own decisions. All subjects signed a consent form immediately before the experiment that 
promised they would be paid “an average amount of $12-$16, but the actual amount will vary 
due to decision-making.”  
The manipulation between the two treatments occurred with the origin of the funds 
utilized in the experiment. Treatment (H) was provided the initial endowment as conventional 
to economic experimental convention. In contrast, treatment (O) was not provided this initial 
endowment. The instructions for treatment (O) and treatment (H) were identical except for two 
lines placed near the top of treatment (O)’s instructions. Treatment (O)’s instructions included 
the following sentences. “In a few moments, you will be asked to give the $8 you brought with 
you today to the experimenter. The $8 will be used to fund your personal investment account 
for use in today’s experiment.” Subjects in treatment (O) would accumulate $8 less than 
subjects in treatment (O). The earnings of subjects in treatment (O) would range from -$4 to 
$16. The earnings of subjects in treatment (H) would range from $4 to $24. To maintain an 
identical final wealth distribution, each subject in treatment (O) was automatically given a $8 
participation fee on top of their VCM decision round earnings.  
A total of 150 students participated, 75were given the house-money (H) treatment and 
75 were given the own-money treatment (O). Within each session, three groups of five were 
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formed. Group pairings were reassigned each round, so no subject shared a group with the 
same four people for any given round.  
The study found the differences in mean allocation decisions across all rounds between 
the two treatments was not statistically significant. Ultimately, the experiment found no 
evidence of a house-money effect in the voluntary public good environment.   
The voluntary public good design utilized in Clark (2002) served as the basis for the 
experimental design utilized in this study. Two treatment groups with similar manipulations 
were employed. In contrast, subjects were paired with the same groupings for each of the 
twenty rounds. Additionally, the manipulation of the own-money treatment differed. Subjects 
were not asked to bring a specified amount of their own money to the experiment. Instead, 
subjects were given money three weeks in advance of the actual experiment. Subjects were 
asked to bring the same amount of money back with them three weeks later. Another difference 
is that subjects in our advance treatment never presented the endowment they were given prior 
to the experiment.  
Harrison (2007) reconsiders evidence from Clark (2002). Clark (2002) claimed to show 
that using “house money” in standard public good experiments has no effect on behavior. 
However, Harrison (2007) shows an effect when one examines the data using appropriate 
statistical methods. Harrison (2007) examined the individual-level responses and accounted 
for the error structure of the panel data. Using the same data in Clark (2002), Harrison (2007) 
clustered each group's standard errors, as the decisions of each subject was not independent 
from the decisions of their group members. Harrison (2007) encouraged the use of panel 
econometric methods over the use of unconditional nonparametric methods. This study utilized 
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panel econometric methods in the analysis section of the study. He also examined the variation 
in the allocation decisions, rather than exclusively focusing on the mean. 
Harrison (2007) addresses the unconventional participation fee applied to the own 
money (O) treatment. Common practice suggests experimenters avoid mentioning specific 
numerical target earnings. In doing so, subjects may adopt a strategy derived from their 
expectations. A numerical target earnings figure was not mentioned in the requirement 
literature utilized in this study.  
Cardenas et. al. (2014) design an experiment focusing on risk preferences over lotteries. 
They seek to determine the extent to which the house-money effect modifies risky decision 
making. The experiment consisted of two sessions with 172. Control and treatment groups 
were utilized in the experiment. Within each session, subjects were randomly assigned to 
treatment groups (cash in advance treatment) or control groups (cash the day of the experiment 
treatment). The standard protocol cash-the-day-of-the-experiment treatment served as the 
control. Over the two sessions, 61 subjects were assigned to each treatment.  
 The advance treatment group received the initial endowment for the experiment 21 
days in advance of the experiment. The control treatment group received the initial endowment 
on the day of the experiment. The 21-day time period between the endowment of the advance 
treatment and the experiment was estimated to be sufficient time for subjects to incorporate 
the cash as part of their pocket money. Subjects were recruited from classrooms. On the day 
of recruitment, an announcement was made about the experiment. The two treatments were 
detailed to all potential subjects and they were told if they participated they would be randomly 
assigned to one of the two treatments. Thus, all subjects had perfect information regarding the 
treatment they were assigned to, as well as the treatment they were not assigned to. Informing 
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all subjects of all the treatments in the experiment is not standard protocol in experimental 
economics 
 On the day of the classroom recruitment, subjects were told the actual experiment 
would be conducted three weeks from that date. All subjects then signed a contract stating they 
would participate in the experiment three weeks from then. Subjects assigned to the advance 
treatment were given 40,000 COP (Columbian currency) after signing the contract. The 
contracts for the advance treatment also included a clause that subjects would bring 40,000 
COP (Columbian currency) back with them on the day of the actual experiment. The 
experiment followed the Binswanger (1980) and Attanasio et al. (2012) Ordered Lottery 
Selection (OLS) design. Each subject was given a piece of paper with six different uniform-
probability lotteries involving possible losses depending on a coin toss. Each subject selected 
one lottery to play. At that time, the subjects were unaware they would make further choices.  
Once each choice had been collected, the subjects were handed a second set of six 
lotteries. However, this set of lotteries did not involve losses. The subjects were told the 
outcome would depend on another coin toss and their payments would be computed using the 
sum of results from both lotteries. After the new choices had been collected, subjects were then 
asked to complete a socioeconomic survey. At this point each coin toss took place.  
Prior to the start of the experiment, each subject was asked how much money they had 
in their pockets. The study found subjects in the advance treatment group had significantly 
more cash in their pockets than the control. However, the difference was smaller than the initial 
endowment. This amount was calculated by taking the amount subjects self-reported and 
subtracting the initial endowment. It was estimated that the advance treatment spent on average 
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thirty-five percent of their advance payment cash. The demographic and questionnaire data 
from Cardenas et. al. (2014) can be seen in Table 1. 
Table 1: Demographic Characteristics of Treatment and Control Groups, Cardenas et al. (2014)  
 
 
On average, the study found no major statistical difference in the distributions of the 
observed coefficient of risk behavior across the two groups. In contrast, after controlling for 
the available cash the subjects had in their pockets at the time of the experiment, the study 
found that those in the treatment group who had more money with them on the day of the 
experiment tended to be more risk tolerant while those who had less where more risk averse. 
If the spending of the endowed money is interpreted as the spending of one's own money, the 
findings suggest a small house-money effect.  
The design of the advance payment process was relied upon in designing the procedures 
for this study. Similar to Cardenas et. al. (2014), subjects in the advance treatment were given 
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an initial endowment three weeks prior to the experiment. Additionally, the questions 
pertaining to money in pocket and what they did with the advance money in the 21 days prior 
to the experiment were expanded. As detailed in the next section, subjects were recruited using 
an existing subject database so that subjects were not told about the treatment they were not 
assigned to. 
 
3.         Experimental design  
 
Subjects were volunteers from the student body of Appalachian State University. The 
subjects were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) via emails sent to the Appalachian 
Experimental Economics Laboratory subject database (AppEEL). Each subject in the database 
received an email to participate in the experiment. A total of 69 subjects participated in the 
experiment. Two treatments were examined, the house treatment (the control) and the advance 
treatment. As a variation of the experimental protocol used by Cardenas et al. (2014), all 
subjects came to the AppEEL laboratory twice. During the initial visit, subjects were told that 
the actual experiment would take place three weeks from that day and time. Subjects were then 
offered contracts stating they would return 21 days later to participate in the experiment. 
Subjects in both treatments were paid $5 for showing up to the first session, regardless of 
whether they signed the contract or not. The contract in the advance treatment also mentioned 
that subjects would be paid an additional $12.50 if they signed the contract to return in three 
weeks. The contract stated they were guaranteed to make at least $5 during the second session. 
If subjects lost a portion of the $12.50 during the second session, they agreed to reimburse the 
money that was lost at that time. An advance payment of $12.50 was chosen as this is the self-
interested, monetary maximizing Nash equilibrium of the public goods game subjects played 
during the second session. The first session took approximately 10 minutes. 
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Due to concerns that subjects would not sign the contract or subjects would sign the 
contract but not show up for the second session, more subjects were recruited for the first 
session than we expected to have complete the study. In the control treatment, 45 subjects 
showed up for the first session, 44 signed the contract, and 36 returned for the second session. 
In the advance treatment, 47 subjects showed up for the first session, 41 signed the contract 
and received the advance payment, and 33 returned for the second session with at least the 
advance payment amount in cash. One subject who signed the contract and received the 
advance payment but did not return for the second session emailed Dr. Stoddard the next day. 
He returned $6 of the $12.50 to Dr. Stoddard in his office the next day.   
The purpose of the advance payment three weeks prior to the experiment was to give 
subjects time to feel as if the $12.50 was their own money. Cardenas et al. (2014) estimated 
that subjects spent approximately 30% of the advance payment in their study. However, as 
described in more detail in the next section, their measurement for how much of the advance 
payment subjects spent before returning to the lab is faulty. The Cardenas et al. (2014) measure 
applied to the data from experiment would imply subjects did not spend any of the advance 
payment and brought more cash to the experiment as backup. Fortunately, in this study, 
additional measures were used to measure how much they spent. These measure report that 
some subjects did spend some of the advance payment prior to returning to the lab for the 
second session.  
At the second session, subjects participated in a repeated VCM public goods game, 
similar to Clark (2002). The public goods game consisted of 20 rounds. For each treatment, 
subjects were randomly and anonymously matched into groups of 3. Each subject remained in 
the same group for all 20 rounds of the experiment. Each subject had a private account, and 
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the three group members together shared a group account. Each subject started each round with 
50 tokens in his/her private account. In each round, each group member allocated tokens to the 
group account from his/her own private account.  Each token a group member allocated to the 
group account; 1 token came out of their own private account. However, each token allocated 
to the group account was multiplied by 1.5. At the conclusion of each round, subjects received 
the remaining tokens in their private accounts, as well as ⅓ of the ending value of the tokens 
in the group account.  
The dominant strategy for subjects wishing to maximize their own earnings, assuming 
all subjects in the group wish to maximize their own earnings, is to move zero tokens into the 
group account. The group’s total earnings are maximized when all subjects allocate all of their 
endowment of tokens to the group account. Subjects made all decisions without knowledge of 
the decisions of their other group members. However, at the conclusion of each round, subjects 
were shown the number of tokens moved to the group account by each individual member of 
the group. Additionally, subjects were shown their own earnings in tokens for each round. The 
computerized experiment was programmed with zTree (Fischbacher, 2007).  
The contracts and instructions are included in the Appendix. The instructions for the 
public goods game were identical between the two treatments, with one exception. Instructions 
for the advance treatment (A) included this additional statement.  
If your earnings from the experiment are greater than $12.50, then you will receive the 
difference at the conclusion of the session. If your earnings from the experiment are 
less than $12.50, you will need to pay the experimenter the difference between $12.50 
and your earnings. For instance, if you earn $14, at the conclusion of the session you 
will be paid $1.50. In contrast, if you earn $11, at the conclusion of the session you will 
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need to pay the experimenter $1.50. You will always be able to avoid losing money 
with certainty through your own decisions.  
 
At the conclusion of the experiment, subjects from the house treatment were given an 
envelope with their individual earnings. This procedure differed from the process utilized in 
the payment of the advance treatment subjects. For subjects in the advance treatment, 
envelopes contained only the amount above the initial $12.50 given to subjects two weeks prior 
to the experiment. Additionally, subjects with earnings below the advance payment of $12.50 
paid the experimenter the difference between the advance payment and their actual earnings. 
Only one subject earned less than the $12.50 advance payment. This subject paid the 
experimenter $0.25.  
Finally, subjects completed a post-experiment questionnaire, included below. The 
questions were developed after reviving past research conducted by Cardenas et. al. (2014) 
asked all subjects how much cash they currently had in their possession (first question). The 
aim of this question is to get a measure of how much of the advance payment subjects had 
spent. However, to get at this measure more directly, we expand the questionnaire to include 
questions 2 & 3.1 
                                                 
1 Cardenas et al. (2014) also had subjects answer socio-economics questions, which we did not include. 
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House Treatment (H) Post-Experiment Questionnaire 
1. How much cash do you currently have in your possession? 
 
Advance Treatment (A) Post-Experiment Questionnaire 
1. How much cash do you currently have in your possession (including the $12.50 you received 
from the experimenters prior to today)? 
 
2. Of the original $12.50 cash you received from the experimenters prior to today, how much 
of that specific cash do you have left? For instance, if you spent $5.25 on a sandwich, then you 
would have $7.25 left ($12.50 - $5.25) and would have needed to replace the $5.25 before you 
came to the session today. 
 
3. If you have all of the original $12.50 cash left, why did you not spend it before today? 
(Possible multiple choice options: Felt obligated to bring all of the original cash to the session; 
Do not typically make purchases with cash; Other-please describe below.) 
 
4.         Results and Analysis 
 Table 2 displays the demographic characteristics of the two treatment groups, house 
(control) and advance. Each treatment consisted of students from Appalachian State 
University. The age of the subjects ranged from 18 to 29. The number of semesters studied 
ranged from 1 to 5. Additionally, the subjects belonged to 38 different areas of study (majors). 
The number of economics courses completed by each subject ranged from 0 to six courses. 
The maximum number of economics experiments the subjects participated in did not exceed 
10 experiments.  
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Table 2 also includes survey data collected at the conclusion of the experiment. Cash 
in wallet is the average amount of cash each subject in each treatment had in their pocket at 
the time of the experiment. The difference between the house treatment and the advance 
treatment is $14.70, slightly higher than the advance payment of $12.50. The Adjusted money 
in pocket in the house treatment is the subjects’ answer to the Cash in wallet question plus an 
amount equivalent to the advance payment of $12.50. An average subject in the advance 
treatment had $2.20 more than subjects in the house treatment. That subjects on average had 
more in the advance treatment is important when compared to analysis conducted in Cardenas 
et al. (2014). They found subjects in the house treatment had more cash and ascribe the 
difference as proof that the subjects in the advance treatment viewed the money as their own. 
They interpret the difference in cash in wallet at the session between treatment conditions as 
evidence that subjects assigned to the advance treatment spent some of the advance payment. 
If Cardenas et al. (2014) had found a difference across treatments as we do, they would have 
had no evidence to suggest their protocol worked.  
Fortunately, Cardenas et al. (2014) suggest a better measure for determining if subjects 
spent any of the advance payment would be to ask subjects directly how much of the advance 
payment they spent. We did this. On average, subjects in the advance treatment reported 
spending $2.68 ($12.50 - $9.82) of the original advance cash payment. Thus, despite not 
finding evidence that subjects in the house treatment had more cash in their wallets at the time 
of the experiment than subjects in the advance treatment, the Cash remaining question provides 
evidence that at least some subjects viewed the advance money as their own. Cardenas et al. 
(2014) estimated subjects spent 35% of the advance payment. Our estimate is 21% including 
all 33 subjects in the advance treatment. However, 10 of the 33 (30%) reported spending at 
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least some of the advance $12.50. Subjects who spent at least some of the advance cash 
reported spending $8.85 ($12.50 – $3.65). Of course, subjects could have made additional 
purchases due to a wealth effect from the advance payment without spending the actual cash 
they received at the first session after signing the contract. Thus, our estimate of that subjects 
spent on average 21% of the advance payment and that 30% of the subjects spent some of the 
advance payment should be interpreted as lower bounds for the effectiveness of the advance 
payment protocol in establishing that subjects internalized the advance payment as their own 
money. 
Table 2: Demographic & Survey Summary Statistics 
 
 
4.1. Allocation Decisions in the Public Goods Game  
We now move to an analysis of the allocation decisions in the public goods game. 
Figure 1 displays the average total group contribution of the house (control) and advance 
treatment groups over all 20 rounds of the experiment. It's important to note, with the design 
of the experiment, only the subject’s first decision round was independent of the two other 
subjects in their group. Therefore, the existence of a house-money effect was most likely to be 
seen in round one of the experiment. As can be observed by the averages reported in Table 3, 
a Wilcoxon ranksum test reports no statistical difference can be seen between the house and 
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advance treatments in round one (p = 0.7790) and when analyzing average decisions across all 
20 rounds of the experiment (p = 0.6506).  
Figure 1: Average Group Allocation 
 
 
 
Table 3: Summary Statistics of Individual Allocation Decisions 
Treatment Number of 
Subjects/Group 
Mean Allocation 
(St Dev) 
Round 1 
Mean Allocation 
(St Dev) 
All Rounds 
Control (House) 36/12 25.47 (16.54), N=36 19.19 (9.81), N=12 
Advance 33/11 22.76 (13.40), N=33 20.05 (7.05), N=11 
An independent observation in round 1 is a subject. An independent observation across all rounds is a group. 
Figure 2 displays a time trend of the proportion of complete free riders over all 20 
rounds of the experiment. Two sessions of each treatment were combined and averaged over 
the course of the experiment to compile the graph. The proportion of free-riders was higher in 
the house treatment for all but round one of the experiments. If the origin of the subjects starting 
capital was an influencing factor on their decisions to contribute to the group account, subjects 
would be expected to show a preference for risk aversion. Ultimately, the results displayed in 
Figure 2 are the opposite of what is expected if a house-money effect exists.  
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Figure 3 displays a time trend of the proportion of full contributors over all 20 rounds 
of the experiment. Two sessions of each treatment were combined and averaged over the 
course of the experiment to compile the graph. The proportion of full contributors was higher 
in the house treatment for all but rounds four, eleven, sixteen, and twenty. When analyzing the 
house-money effect and the origin of starting capital, a lower proportion of full contributors is 
expected in the advance treatment. However, the variation between the house treatment and 
advance treatment was not statistically significant, suggesting an absence of a house-money 
effect.  
Figure 4 displays a time trend of the average proportion of positive contributors over 
all 20 rounds of the experiment. Two sessions of each treatment were combined and averaged 
over the course of the experiment to compile the graph. The average proportion of positive 
contributors was higher in the house treatment for all but rounds eleven, twelve, and thirteen. 
In rounds eleven, twelve, and thirteen, the average proportion of positive contributors was 
slightly higher in the advance treatment. When analyzing the house-money effect and the 
origin of starting capital, a lower average proportion of positive contributors is expected in the 
advance treatment. However, the variation between the house treatment and advance treatment 
was not statistically significant, suggesting an absence of a house-money effect.  
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Figure 4: Time Trend of the Average Contribution of Positive Contributors  
 
Table 4displays a two-sample T-Test with equal variances. This test analyzed the 
average contribution amounts of the house and advance treatment groups. The alternative 
hypothesis suggests the average contribution of treatment group one (house), should be 
statistically different than the average contribution of treatment group two (advance). With a 
p-value of 0.4071, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. Therefore, the average contribution 
of group one is equal to the average contribution of group 2.  
Table 4: Two-sample t test with equal variances 
 
 
Table 4.1: Two-sample Wilcoxon Rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test 
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Table 5 displays a two-sample T-Test with equal variances. This test analyzed the 
proportion of free-riders in the house and advance treatment groups. The alternative hypothesis 
suggests the proportion of free-riders in treatment group one (house), should be statistically 
different than the proportion of free-riders in treatment group two (advance). Prior evidence 
supporting the house-money effect suggests the proportion of free-riders in treatment group 
two (advance) should be significantly higher than the proportion of free-riders in treatment 
group one (house). However, with a p-value of 0.9309, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected 
at the 0.05 significance level. Therefore, the proportion of free-riders in treatment group two 
(advance), is not statistically different from the proportion of free-riders in treatment group 
one (house).  
Table 5: Two-sample t test with equal variances 
 
 
Table 5.1: Two-sample Wilcoxon Rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test 
 
Table 6 displays a two-sample T-Test with equal variances. This test analyzed the 
proportion of full contributors in the house and advance treatment groups. The alternative 
hypothesis suggests the proportion of full contributors in treatment group one (house), should 
be statistically different than the proportion full contributors in treatment group two (advance). 
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Prior evidence supporting the house-money effect suggests the proportion of full contributors 
in treatment group two (advance) should be significantly lower than the proportion of full 
contributors in treatment group one (house). The results of the experiment show the proportion 
of full contributors in treatment group two (advance), is lower than the proportion of full 
contributors in treatment group one (house). However, with a p-value of 0.8766, the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 0.05 significance level. Therefore, the proportion of full 
contributors in treatment group two (advance), is not statistically different from the proportion 
of full contributors in treatment group one (house).  
 
Table 6: Two-sample t test with equal variances 
 
 
Table 6.1: Two-sample Wilcoxon Rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test 
 
 
 Table 7 displays a group level panel regression. This regression includes three 
dependent variables and their relation to the independent variable. The first dependent variable 
is the advance treatment and is denoted by advance. The second dependent variable is the 
period and is denoted by period. The third dependent variable is con and is denoted by con.?? 
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The independent variable is the average group contribution to the group account. The house-
money effect would suggest a statistical impact on the average contribution from the advance 
dependent variable. As shown, the advance treatment had no significant impact on the average 
group contribution with a p-value of 0.812. In contrast, both the period and cons did 
significantly impact the average group contribution.  
Table 7: Group Level Panel Regression 
 
 
 
 
5.         Discussion and Summary 
 
Past research conducted on the house-money effect found statistical evidence when 
testing for the effect in lottery games. Additionally, multiple studies have found statistical 
evidence of the effect within public goods games. Our study, combined, and expanded on, 
experimental procedures utilized in prior experiments, thus serving as a robustness check on 
these past studies. We did not find evidence of a house-money effect within a public goods 
environment.  
The experiment was run with 69 subjects in two treatment groups. Of the 69 subjects 
who participated in the experiment, 36 subjects participated in the house treatment and 33 
subjects participated in the advance treatment. For each treatment, subjects were randomly and 
anonymously matched into groups of three. Each subject remained in the same group for all 
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20 rounds of the experiment. Each subject had a private account, and the three group members 
together shared a group account. In each round, subjects selected between allocating tokens to 
the group account and their own private account. Each member of the group was faced with 
this choice. Each subject started the round with 50 tokens in their private account. The house 
treatment served as the control group, with advance treatment as the test group. Subjects from 
both treatments participated in a multi-round experiment taking place over a three week-time 
span. The house and advance groups were spread over two days (with the corresponding date 
and time three weeks later). Each treatment was conducted once per day. The manipulation of 
the advance treatment involved an endowment of $12.50 that subjects received three weeks 
prior to the experiment. These subjects were told to bring $12.50 to the actual experiment. The 
experiment consisted of 20 rounds.  
In conclusion, this study served as a robustness check on past research conducted on 
the house-money effect. The study utilized an alternative experimental design to induce own-
money effects. However, the study did not find statistical evidence of a house-money effect 
within the public goods environment; observed cooperation rates and rates of free-riding were 
not significantly different between the two treatments. We believe that while a house-money 
effect may be prevalent within other risk environments, the effect is not prevalent within a 
public goods environment.   
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7.         Appendix 
 
House Treatment Instructions & Contract 
 
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
1. You have the opportunity to participate in an economics experiment.  
2. If you decide to participate, you should sign the contract below committing to show 
up on Monday, April 29th, at 3:30pm. 
3. If you decide to participate, the decisions you make in the experiment and the results 
associated with them will remain confidential and anonymous.  
 
Below is the contract to be signed if you decide to participate. Please read the contract 
carefully and sign it.  
 
 
 
 
CONTRACT 
 
I, ________________________ (printed full name), identified with the ID card of 
Appalachian State University, agree to attend an economics experiment on __________(day 
of week), ______________(month and date), at ___________(time) in Peacock Hall room 
#3021. I understand that I am guaranteed at least $5 for participating in both today’s session 
and the second session of the experiment. 
 
 
Signature________________________________________ 
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Advance Treatment Instructions & Contact 
 
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
1. You have the opportunity to participate in an economics experiment. For the 
experiment, you will receive $12.50 today. You will need to bring $12.50 with you to 
the second session of the experiment. You can earn more or less than this amount 
depending on the decisions you make during the second session of the experiment. At 
no point can you lose more than $12.50 that we provide. 
2. If you decide to participate, you should sign the contract below committing to show 
up on __________(day of week), ______________(month and date), at 
___________(time).  
3. If you decide to participate, the decisions you make in the experiment and the results 
associated with them will remain confidential and anonymous.  
 
Below is the contract to be signed if you decide to participate. Please read the contract 
carefully and sign it.  
 
 
 
 
CONTRACT 
 
I, ________________________ (printed full name), identified with the ID card of 
Appalachian State University, agree to voluntarily participate in the experiment and certify 
that I received the $12.50 on ___________(current day of week), ___________(month and 
date) _________(year). 
 
Further, I agree to attend an economics experiment on __________(day of week), 
______________(month and date), at ___________(time) in Peacock Hall room #3021. I 
understand that in the second session of this experiment I can earn more than $12.50 or lose 
some amount of the $12.50 that I have received today. However, I am guaranteed to make at 
least $5 for participating in both today’s session and the second session of the experiment. In 
case I lose some of the $12.50 during the second session of the experiment, I agree to 
reimburse the money I lose at the conclusion of that session.  
 
Signature: ___________________________________________ 
 
 
